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Abstract 
 
 
A delay tolerant network is a highly constrained networking environment which is low in resources such as memory, 
bandwidth and battery power. In opportunistic DTNs, nodes cooperatively forward packets for each other through the 
carry-store-and-forward paradigm. Opportunistic data forwarding can be abused by an adversary by injecting spurious 
packets in order to waste the resources of the network. To guard against such attacks, it is important to authenticate packets 
at intermediate nodes. Packet authentication in itself comes with overheads such as computation cost and energy 
consumption which can be exploited by an attacker to mount a denial of service attack. We propose the use of light-weight 
DTN-cookies to protect this vital security service from such malicious exploitation. We show through simulations that our 
proposed mechanisms can improve network performance and save considerable amount of power even in the presence of 
attackers. 
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1. Introduction 
Providing security to challenged networks like a DTN 
requires new techniques. This is heavily influenced by the 
wireless mode of communication, changing network 
topology, lack of infrastructure, intermittent connectivity, 
multi-hop data transfers and limited power budget and 
resources at nodes [3], [4]. These challenges become even 
more aggravated in the presence of adversaries whose 
primary goal is to prevent the network from fulfilling its 
functions. Denial of service (DOS) attacks is a threat 
which affects both wired and wireless networks. The 
attacker attempts to disrupt or degrade a service provided 
by an entity or network. A DTN is more vulnerable to 
DOS due to its unique nature as espoused above.  
     Common malicious attacks by an adversary include 
flooding the network with bogus packets, counterfeiting 
acknowledgements, dropping packets, address spoofing 
and corrupting routing tables. These attacks have an 
impact on network connectivity, lifespan of network 
nodes and overall packet delivery ratio. DOS mitigation 
techniques which have been proposed and applied in 
conventional networks will not work in DTN. In light of  
 
this, security mechanisms proposed for DTN must take 
into cognizance its peculiar networking constraints and 
challenges in addition to its heterogeneous nature. In this 
paper, we propose mechanisms to detect and react quickly 
to DOS attacks. We use the ONE Simulator to build the 
application scenario and show that our resilience 
mechanisms can counter the effects of DOS attacks and 
boost network performance, guaranty resource availability 
and incur low computational and communication 
overheads. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. In Section 2 we present a brief overview of DTN 
security and related work on DOS mitigation. The 
attacker model, assumptions, and a description of the 
proposed mechanisms are detailed in Section 3. Section 4 
gives an in-depth description of the mobility and routing 
models, simulation parameters and results. The analysis 
and evaluation of the results is done in Section 5. In 
Section 6 we provide conclusions and directions for future 
work. 
2. DTN Security and Related Work 
Standard security protocols like TLS, IPSec have been 
proven not to work well in Challenged environments like 
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DTN. This is due to a lack of continuous end-to-end 
connectivity, disruptions, long delays, opportunistic data 
forwarding and scarcity of resources (memory and CPU) 
[7]. The bundle security protocol defines four extension 
blocks to support hop-by-hop and end-to-end 
authentication, integrity checking and confidentiality [2]  
     In a bid to protect the DTN from resources 
exploitation, the authors of the BSP specify that every 
bundle must have a BAB block which must be validated 
at every hop towards the bundle’s destination. The 
purpose for this requirement is to ensure that resources of 
the DTN are used solely in forwarding valid and authentic 
bundles [2], [13]. This requirement opens a new 
vulnerability which an attacker can exploit. An attacker 
can flood the network with small-sized bundles that are 
BAB-protected. Any unsuspecting security-aware node 
can waste its resources (CPU and battery) verifying these 
bogus bundles. The victim node will therefore become a 
congestion point, run out of battery power and cause 
partitions in the network. A DOS attack is a threat against 
availability [5] [1]. Techniques such as the Client puzzle 
[14], TCP SYN flood mitigation proposed by Juels and 
Brainard [15], the ISAKMP cookie proposed in the 
PHOTORIS protocol [4], [16] cannot be directly applied 
to challenged networks like DTN. 
 
3. System Model and Design 
 
The primary objective of this work is to strengthen the 
DTN hop-by-hop authentication process by making it 
resilient to DOS attacks. A DOS filter mechanism capable 
of quickly detecting and discarding bogus bundles has 
been proposed. The proposed mechanism is light-weight, 
less chatty, hard to forge and robust. Our design takes into 
account a formal framework proposed by Meadows [17] 
to tackle network DOS. 
 
 
Fig 1. A DTN Showing Three Disjoint Regions 
 
 
3.1  Attacker Model 
The computational resource of the attacker is very large. 
The attacker can compute efficiently pseudo-random 
functions and MACs in record time but does not possess 
the network secrets, the attacker is assumed to have the 
ability to replay, modify, transmit, and receive bundles.    
     The attacker has the ability to execute the protocol i.e. 
can compute DTN-cookies and sign bundles, the attacker 
has the ability to take over a legitimate node and in the 
process steal keying material and sensitive data. The 
attacker does not have a global view of the network. 
     In inter-regional communications, the attacker is 
assumed to be a rogue router with enormous processing 
and sending capabilities.  
 
3.2  Assumptions 
 
• A node has bounded resources that could possibly be 
exhausted by a clever attacker 
• Trust is established during initial registration of a 
nodes with the security gateway  
• The protocol is between two communicating entities 
• We assume bi-directional communication asymmetry 
between a pair of nodes. 
• A secure key management mechanism is required for 
the distribution of nonce seeds and cryptographic 
secret keys. 
 
A. Intra-Regional DOS Mitigation  
 
     A robust and effective DOS defence architecture 
should have a Detection, Classification and Response 
element [5]. A generic DTN bundle is made up of the 
primary block and the payload block. To provide DOS-
resilience in DTN, we propose a new security extension 
block called a DTN-COOKIE which adds a light 
authentication phase and has less computational 
overheads at the security-aware nodes. 
 
 
Fig 1.  A DTN bundle with security extension blocks 
 
TS: the timestamp which is a concatenation of a bundle 
creation time and a monotonically increasing sequence 
number which is unique for every new bundle from a 
Source Endpoint Identifier (EID) 
LS: the bundle lifespan or expiration time. The LS value 
of a bundle can be in minutes, hours or days 
Src_EID: the Source EID of a bundle, each EID is 
assumed to be a singleton 
Dst_EID: the Destination EID i.e. the entity for which the 
bundle is destined. 
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RSAwithSHA256: represents the cipher suite  
M: the bundle payload 
H (M): h is the hash value derived by passing the payload 
M through the function H. H is a cryptographic hash 
function such as MD5, SHA1 or SHA256. We will be 
using SHA256 as the underlying hash function to the 
signature and MAC algorithms 
pubKXi: the public key of node Xi 
privKXi: the private key of node Xi. 
 
     The BSP specification [1] provides minimal protection 
against DOS attacks. DTN nodes simply drop bundles that 
fail the authentication and access control checks.  We 
have identified resource exhaustion as a simple means of 
launching DOS attacks and causing availability problems 
in DTN.  For the intra-regional DOS scenario, we propose 
three variants of DTN-cookie which can be dynamically 
chosen based on the perceived Network Threat Level 
(NTL). 
 
DTN-cookie = H ((Timestamp | Src_EIDx) | p-RNG (IV)) - v1 
 
     The Initialization Vector (IV) is known only to 
registered nodes of the region. The IV value is used to 
seed the pseudo-Random Number Generator (p-RNG); 
the result is a random long integer value. A concatenation 
of the timestamp and bundle source EID provides a 
unique bundle identifier. This unique bundle identifier is 
concatenated with the random long integer and hashed 
with H (the SHA-256 algorithm) to produce a fixed-
length hash h which is appended to a bundle as DTN-
cookie. The IV is changed periodically by the regional 
security gateway to ensure freshness. 
 
DTN-cookie = H ((Timestamp | Src_EIDx) Xor p-RNG (IV)) - v2 
 
     The second DTN-cookie variant (v2) is the result when 
we perform a bit-wise Exclusive-OR operation on 
Timestamp|Src_EIDx and p-RNG (IV). | is the 
concatenation operator, p-RNG (IV) is the same as in v1. 
This variant of DTN-cookie has more randomness and 
provides a stronger DOS solution. 
 
DTN-cookie=HMAC ((Timestamp|Src_EIDx) Xor p-PNG (IV), KRS) – v3 
 
     The third DTN-cookie variant (v3) is derived in the 
same way as v2 with SHA-256 as the underlying hash 
function. The only difference is that the result of the 
operation is hashed with a regional secret key KRS to 
produce a fixed-length MAC which we append to every 
bundle. The mode of generation of the secret key, the use 
of p-RNG and bit-wise Exclusive-OR operation inputs 
more randomness to the DTN-cookie. The secrecy of the 
IV and the key makes the DTN-cookie hard to forge. 
These values are changed periodically by the security 
gateway to prevent compromise and ensure freshness.    
     When a bundle arrives at a security-aware node, the 
Bundle Protocol Agent (BPA) examines the bundle to 
determine if it is a Data or Alert bundle originating from a 
legitimate source and not expired. Next the BPA tries to 
determine the perceived Network Threat Level (NTL) 
associated with the bundle. It does this by looking at the 
DTN-COOKIE Block. The DTN-COOKIE Block 
contains the NTL indicator (where Low = 1, Mild = 2, 
Severe = 3). Based on the NTL indicator, the BPA is able 
to choose which cipher suite to use to verify the DTN-
cookie.  
     The DTN-COOKIE Block has a trailer block with the 
security result of the DTN-cookie computation as 
payload. The BPA can also use the Class of Service 
parameter to deduce the type of bundle it is dealing with 
by looking into the CoS field in the bundle primary block. 
Regions are divided into security domains and Network 
Threat Levels (NTL) is set by GH nodes in each domain 
making threat response very localised. 
     Every security-aware node in the DTN maintains a 
Node Misbehaviour List (NML) and an Alert List (AL). 
The NML is for recording failed authentication attempts 
while the AL contains information on blacklisted nodes. 
 
Table 1. NTL and Corresponding DTN-Cookie  
Variants 
 
 
Table 1 associates each DTN-cookie variant to a NTL 
value. This helps security-aware nodes to determine 
which cookie variant to apply at any point in time. This 
design makes the solution adaptive to varying threat 
intensities and save battery power. Egress filtering is used 
to stop attackers spoofing their addresses to mount an 
attack. Also we limit the rate at which a node can send 
packets per connection at any given timeframe to prevent 
flooding using bogus packets. 
 
 
B. Inter-Regional DOS Mitigation 
 
     It is important to secure the inter-regional segment of 
DTN communications to ensure availability of services. 
Disjoint regions can be connected either by a bus, ship, 
satellite that act as a data mule or relay. In this 
communication scenario we assume that gateways are 
powerful workstations with large storage and processing 
capabilities. To prevent the attacker from spoofing 
addresses, ingress filtering is enforced at the gateways. 
Communication between regions is restricted to be 
gateway-to-gateway. The composition of DTN-cookie 
used for gateway-to-gateway communication is given 
below: 
 
DTN-cookie=HMAC ((Timestamp|Src_EIDx) Xor p-PNG (IV), KS) – v3 
 
Network 
Threat 
Level (NTL) 
NTL 
Classification 
Cookie Type 
NTL1 LOW Variant1 (v1) 
NTL2 MILD Variant2 (v2) 
NTL3 SEVERE Variant3 (v3) 
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The DTN-cookie is same as the v3 used in intra-regional 
communication. The subtle difference is the use of an 
inter-regional symmetric key KS.  
4. Simulation Models, Parameters and  
    Results 
 
A. Mobility Models 
 
We use a combination of Map-based and Random Way 
Point (RWP) movement models [9] for the simulations. 
Legitimate nodes use a simple Map-based movement 
model and are modelled as pedestrians (Group 1 and 3), 
cars (Group 2) and trams (Group 4, 5 and 6). Cars have 
speeds ranging from 15-40Km/h and pause time of 20-
150s. Trams run at speeds 20-60Km/h with pause time of 
10-20s. Adversary nodes (6 nodes) use the RWP 
movement model and are modelled as pedestrians moving 
at random speeds of 2-10m/s with pause time of 5-20s 
which are both uniformly distributed. Nodes in the 
network use Bluetooth or High-speed interface to 
communicate. 
 
B. Routing Models 
 
     In our simulations we use Epidemic routing [8] which 
is a replication-based routing protocol which helps us 
model the worst-case for a flooding-based DOS attack 
scenario. Other routing DTN routing protocols such as 
MaxProp [10], Spray and Wait [11] and Prophet [12] can 
be used with the proposed mechanisms to achieve an 
increase in throughput. 
 
C. Results 
 
 
5. Evaluation  
 
The proposed solutions require a unidirectional message 
to achieve message authentication thereby discouraging 
the roundtrips required in TLS-type of handshake. The 
DTN-cookies use simple hash functions and symmetric 
key cryptography which impose less computational 
complexity during authentication. Symmetric 
cryptography and hash functions are four orders of 
magnitude faster than asymmetric cryptography and 
digital signatures.  
     The concatenation of the timestamp and source_EID 
which act as a unique bundle identifier is a strong feature 
for thwarting replay attacks. The light authentication 
phase protects security-aware nodes against resource 
exhaustion attacks which targets battery power and CPU 
cycles. The Network Threat Level indicators make the 
proposed solution adaptive to varying intensities of DOS 
attacks. The use a cryptographically secure random 
number generator, secret nonces make the proposed 
mechanisms random and hard to forge.   
     Figure 2 is used to show the computational complexity 
of the three proposed DTN cookie variants. Using three 
different simulation runs, we set the NTL values to 1, 2 
and 3 respectively (see table1). From this result it is clear 
that the v1 cookie variant imposes less computational cost 
overhead on the nodes. The v3 cookie variant is more 
complex and secure but imposes more battery power 
overhead on the nodes. Nodes in the three groups have 
same simulation parameters as shown in table 2. The 
energy level of nodes is captured at snapshots of 60 
seconds interval. 
     In figure 3 each group is assigned a different NTL 
value e.g. Group1.Ntl = 1, Group2.Ntl =2 and Group2.Ntl 
=3. We take snapshots of energy level of each node every 
60 seconds. The y-axis shows the average energy level for 
a typical DTN node during each snapshot interval. From 
the result, it evident that the v1 cookie variant is less 
computational expensive when compared to the v2 and v3 
variants. The aim of using different cookie variants for 
different network threat levels is to make the DOS 
resilience mechanism adaptive and energy efficient.    
      Figure 4 shows the energy gain when light 
authentication is performed using any of the proposed 
DTN cookie variants. This result shows that a significant 
amount of battery power can be saved using our light 
authentication mechanisms. Signature verification is a 
computationally expensive cryptographic procedure 
which requires modular exponentiation. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Denial of Service attacks degrades network service and 
performance and new methods of attacks are evolving 
every day. In this paper we presented mechanisms that 
can proactively protect challenged networks such DTN 
against flooding-based DOS. We have evaluated the 
properties of our resilience mechanism and show that our 
proposed mechanisms are light-weight, hard to forge, less 
chatty and suitable DTN environments. The simulations 
show the effectiveness of our cookie mechanisms in 
combating resource-exhaustion attacks mounted through 
flooding.   
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